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Trammell Hudson
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README.md
167
README.md
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ to commodity hardware. Among its goals are:
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* Measure and attest to the state of the firmware
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* Measure and verify all filesystems
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NOTE: It is a work in progress and not yet ready for users.
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If you're interested in contributing, please get in touch.
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@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ Installation requires disassembly of your laptop or server,
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external SPI flash programmers, possible risk of destruction and
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significant frustration.
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More information is available in [the 33C3 presentation of building "Slightly more secure systems"](https://trmm.net/Heads_33c3).
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Building heads
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===
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@ -49,169 +51,6 @@ of the Xen command line. Booting or installing Qubes is a bit hacky and needs t
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* Coreboot 4.4 does not handle initrd separately from the kernel correctly, so it must be bundled into the coreboot image. Building from git does the right thing.
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Threat model
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===
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Heads considers two broad classes of threats:
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* Attackers with physical access to the system
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** Customs officials, LEO, etc with brief access
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** "Evil maid" attacks with longer, but still limited access (sans password)
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** Stolen machines, with unlimited physical access without password
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** Insider attacks with unlimited time, with password
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** Insider attacks with unlimited time, with password and without regard for the machine
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* Attackers with ring0 code execution on the runtime system
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The first is hardest to deal with since it allows an attacker to
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make physical changes to the machine. Without a hardware root of
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trust and secrets stored inside that CPU, it is very difficult to
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project against a physical attackers who can replace components and
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fake measurements. Hardware measurements of the boot ROM (such as
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Intel's Boot Guard) can help, although a dedicated attacker could
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replace the CPU with one that is not fused to do the initial measurement.
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The best that we can do is to lock the bootblock on the SPI flash,
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perform the first measurement from it and hope that there are not any
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exploits against the chip itself.
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The second class is also a difficult challenge, but since it is only
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a software attack, we have better hopes of handling with some harware
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modifications. The SPI flash chip's boot block protection modes can
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be locked on and the WP# pin grounded, which will prevent any software
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attacks from overwriting that portion of the boot ROM. This gives us
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a better root of trust than the EFI configurations, most of which do
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not lock the boot ROM.
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Even if they are not able to write to the ROM, the attackers might
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be able to use their software code execution to modify the system
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software or boot partition on the drive. The recommended OS
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configuration is a read-only `/boot` and `/` filesystem, with
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only the user data directories writable. Additional protection
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comes from using dm-verity on the file systems, which will
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detect any writes to the filesystem through a hash tree
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that is signed by the user's (offline) key.
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Updates to `/` or `/boot` will require a special boot mode,
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which can be selected by the boot firmware. After the file
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systems are updated, the user can sign the new hashes with their
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key on a different machine and store the signed root hash on the
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drive. TPM keys might need to be migrated as well for the recovery
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boot mode. On next boot the firmware will mount the drives read-only
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and verify that the correct key was used to sign the changes,
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and the TPM should be able to unseal the secrets for TPMTOTP
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as well as the drive decryption.
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---
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dm-verity setup
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===
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*You must install `libdevmapper-dev`, `libpopt-dev` and `libgcrypt-dev` to build cryptsetup*
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This set of tools isn't the easiest to use. It is possible to store
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hashes on the device that is being hashed if some work is done ahead
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of time to reserve the last few blocks or if the file system can be
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resized.
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The size of the hash table grows logarithmic with the size of the
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filesystem. Every 4K block is hashed, and then 4K of those blocks
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are hashed, and so on until there is only one hash left.
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Each hash is 32 bytes, so the hash tree size is 32 * log_4096(fs)
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The hashes can be stored on a separate device or on the free space
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at the end of an existing partition. This will require resizing
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if you didn't allocate the space initially.
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The sizes of physical partitions can be read (in 512-byte blocks) from
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`/sys/class/block/sda1/size`. The `resize2fs` tool (assuming you're using
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a normal ext4 filesystem) will not resize smaller than the free
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space. Figure out the desired size
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fs_size = $[30 * 1024 * 1024]
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e2fsck hdd.img
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resize2fs hdd.img $fs_size
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Once the file system has been resized to make space at the end,
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the dm-verity tools can generate the hashes. The file system
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must be unmounted before this is done, otherwise the hashes
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will not be correct.
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veritysetup \
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--data-blocks $[$fs_size / 4096] \
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--hash-offset $fs_size \
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format hdd.img hdd.img \
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| tee verity.log
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This will output a text file that contains several important
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constants for mounting the filesystem later:
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VERITY header information for hdd.img
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UUID: 73532888-a3e9-4f16-a50a-1d03a265b94f
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Hash type: 1
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Data blocks: 7680
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Data block size: 4096
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Hash block size: 4096
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Hash algorithm: sha256
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Salt: 3d0cd593d29715005794c4e1cd5164c14ba6456c3dbd2c6d8a26007c01ca9937
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Root hash: 91beda90d7fa1ab92463344966eb56ec9706f4f26063933a86d701a02a961a10
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Unfortunately this is in the wrong form for the `dmsetup` command
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and must be reformmated like this:
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dmsetup create vroot --readonly --table \
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"0 61440 verity 1 /dev/sda /dev/sda 4096 4096 7680 7681 sha256 "\
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"c51e171a1403eda7636c89f10d90066d6a593223399fdd4c36ab214da3c6fc11 "\
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"f6c6c6b6cbdf2682d6213e65b0e577cb57c8af3015f88f9a40fb512eaf48aca9"
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The 61440 is the number of 512-byte blocks that the filesystem uses.
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The two 4096 are the data block size and hash block size.
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The 7680 is the number of data blocks and the 7861 is the first
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datablock containing hashes (note that block 7680 contains the `VERITY`
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header and the salt, but not the root hash). The hash and salt are
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reversed in the order from the `veritysetup` printout.
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We sign this command and stash it in the block after the `VERITY`
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header so that the firmware can validate the image before mounting it.
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This does require that the firmware be able to find the header;
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for now we have it hard coded.
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mbedtls vs OpenSSL
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---
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mbedtls is a significantly smaller and more modular library than
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OpenSSL's libcrypto (380KB vs 2.3MB). It is not API compatible,
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so applications must be written to use it.
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One the build host side we can make use of openssl's tools, but in
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the firmware we are limited to the smaller library. They are mostly
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compatible, although the tools are quite different.
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Generate the private/public key pair (and copy the public key to
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the initrd):
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openssl genrsa -aes256 -out signing.key
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openssl rsa -pubout -in signing.key -out signing.pub
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Sign something (requires password and private key):
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openssl pkeyutl \
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-sign \
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-inkey signing.key \
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-in roothash \
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-out roothash.sig
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Verify it (requires public key, no password):
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openssl pkeyutl \
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-verify \
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-pubin
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-inkey signing.pub \
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-sigfile roothash.sig \
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-in roothash
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but this doesn't work with pk_verify from mbedtls. more work is necessary.
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Signing with GPG
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---
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