The slave sends \n keepalive messages to the master while parsing the rdb,
and later sends REPLCONF ACK once a second. rarely, the master recives both
a linefeed char and a REPLCONF in the same read, \n*3\r\n$8\r\nREPLCONF\r\n...
and it tries to trim two chars (\r\n) from the query buffer,
trimming the '*' from *3\r\n$8\r\nREPLCONF\r\n...
then the master tries to process a command starting with '3' and replies to
the slave a bunch of -ERR and one +OK.
although the slave silently ignores these (prints a log message), this corrupts
the replication offset at the slave since the slave increases the replication
offset, and the master did not.
other than the fix in processInlineBuffer, i did several other improvments
while hunting this very rare bug.
- when redis replies with "unknown command" it includes a portion of the
arguments, not just the command name. so it would be easier to understand
what was recived, in my case, on the slave side, it was -ERR, but
the "arguments" were the interesting part (containing info on the error).
- about a year ago i added code in addReplyErrorLength to print the error to
the log in case of a reply to master (since this string isn't actually
trasmitted to the master), now changed that block to print a similar log
message to indicate an error being sent from the master to the slave.
note that the slave is marked as CLIENT_SLAVE only after PSYNC was received,
so this will not cause any harm for REPLCONF, and will only indicate problems
that are gonna corrupt the replication stream anyway.
- two places were c->reply was emptied, and i wanted to reset sentlen
this is a precaution (i did not actually see such a problem), since a
non-zero sentlen will cause corruption to be transmitted on the socket.
The ability of "SENTINEL SET" to change the reconfiguration script at
runtime is a problem even in the security model of Redis: any client
inside the network may set any executable to be ran once a failover is
triggered.
This option adds protection for this problem: by default the two
SENTINEL SET subcommands modifying scripts paths are denied. However the
user is still able to rever that using the Sentinel configuration file
in order to allow such a feature.
After the first fix to the struct package I found another similar
problem, which is fixed by this patch. It could be reproduced easily by
running the following script:
return struct.unpack('f', "xxxxxxxxxxxxx",-3)
The above will access bytes before the 'data' pointer.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
During an auditing Apple found that the "struct" Lua package
we ship with Redis (http://www.inf.puc-rio.br/~roberto/struct/) contains
a security problem. A bound-checking statement fails because of integer
overflow. The bug exists since we initially integrated this package with
Lua, when scripting was introduced, so every version of Redis with
EVAL/EVALSHA capabilities exposed is affected.
Instead of just fixing the bug, the library was updated to the latest
version shipped by the author.
During an auditing effort, the Apple Vulnerability Research team discovered
a critical Redis security issue affecting the Lua scripting part of Redis.
-- Description of the problem
Several years ago I merged a pull request including many small changes at
the Lua MsgPack library (that originally I authored myself). The Pull
Request entered Redis in commit 90b6337c1, in 2014.
Unfortunately one of the changes included a variadic Lua function that
lacked the check for the available Lua C stack. As a result, calling the
"pack" MsgPack library function with a large number of arguments, results
into pushing into the Lua C stack a number of new values proportional to
the number of arguments the function was called with. The pushed values,
moreover, are controlled by untrusted user input.
This in turn causes stack smashing which we believe to be exploitable,
while not very deterministic, but it is likely that an exploit could be
created targeting specific versions of Redis executables. However at its
minimum the issue results in a DoS, crashing the Redis server.
-- Versions affected
Versions greater or equal to Redis 2.8.18 are affected.
-- Reproducing
Reproduce with this (based on the original reproduction script by
Apple security team):
https://gist.github.com/antirez/82445fcbea6d9b19f97014cc6cc79f8a
-- Verification of the fix
The fix was tested in the following way:
1) I checked that the problem is no longer observable running the trigger.
2) The Lua code was analyzed to understand the stack semantics, and that
actually enough stack is allocated in all the cases of mp_pack() calls.
3) The mp_pack() function was modified in order to show exactly what items
in the stack were being set, to make sure that there is no silent overflow
even after the fix.
-- Credits
Thank you to the Apple team and to the other persons that helped me
checking the patch and coordinating this communication.
The AOF tail of a combined RDB+AOF is based on the premise of applying
the AOF commands to the exact state that there was in the server while
the RDB was persisted. By expiring keys while loading the RDB file, we
change the state, so applying the AOF tail later may change the state.
Test case:
* Time1: SET a 10
* Time2: EXPIREAT a $time5
* Time3: INCR a
* Time4: PERSIT A. Start bgrewiteaof with RDB preamble. The value of a is 11 without expire time.
* Time5: Restart redis from the RDB+AOF: consistency violation.
Thanks to @soloestoy for providing the patch.
Thanks to @trevor211 for the original issue report and the initial fix.
Check issue #4950 for more info.
While this feature is not used by Redis, ae.c implements the ability for
a timer to call a finalizer callback when an timer event is deleted.
This feature was bugged since the start, and because it was never used
we never noticed a problem. However Anthony LaTorre was using the same
library in order to implement a different system: he found a bug that he
describes as follows, and which he fixed with the patch in this commit,
sent me by private email:
--- Anthony email ---
've found one bug in the current implementation of the timed events.
It's possible to lose track of a timed event if an event is added in
the finalizerProc of another event.
For example, suppose you start off with three timed events 1, 2, and
3. Then the linked list looks like:
3 -> 2 -> 1
Then, you run processTimeEvents and events 2 and 3 finish, so now the
list looks like:
-1 -> -1 -> 2
Now, on the next iteration of processTimeEvents it starts by deleting
the first event, and suppose this finalizerProc creates a new event,
so that the list looks like this:
4 -> -1 -> 2
On the next iteration of the while loop, when it gets to the second
event, the variable prev is still set to NULL, so that the head of the
event loop after the next event will be set to 2, i.e. after deleting
the next event the event loop will look like:
2
and the event with id 4 will be lost.
I've attached an example program to illustrate the issue. If you run
it you will see that it prints:
```
foo id = 0
spam!
```
But if you uncomment line 29 and run it again it won't print "spam!".
--- End of email ---
Test.c source code is as follows:
#include "ae.h"
#include <stdio.h>
aeEventLoop *el;
int foo(struct aeEventLoop *el, long long id, void *data)
{
printf("foo id = %lld\n", id);
return AE_NOMORE;
}
int spam(struct aeEventLoop *el, long long id, void *data)
{
printf("spam!\n");
return AE_NOMORE;
}
void bar(struct aeEventLoop *el, void *data)
{
aeCreateTimeEvent(el, 0, spam, NULL, NULL);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
el = aeCreateEventLoop(100);
//aeCreateTimeEvent(el, 0, foo, NULL, NULL);
aeCreateTimeEvent(el, 0, foo, NULL, bar);
aeMain(el);
return 0;
}
Anthony fixed the problem by using a linked list for the list of timers, and
sent me back this patch after he tested the code in production for some time.
The code looks sane to me, so committing it to Redis.
See issue #2819 for details. The gist is that when we want to send INFO
because we are over the time, we used to send only INFO commands, no
longer sending PING commands. However if a master fails exactly when we
are about to send an INFO command, the PING times will result zero
because the PONG reply was already received, and we'll fail to send more
PINGs, since we try only to send INFO commands: the failure detector
will delay until the connection is closed and re-opened for "long
timeout".
This commit changes the logic so that we can send the three kind of
messages regardless of the fact we sent another one already in the same
code path. It could happen that we go over the message limit for the
link by a few messages, but this is not significant. However now we'll
not introduce delays in sending commands just because there was
something else to send at the same time.
This commit, in some parts derived from PR #3041 which is no longer
possible to merge (because the user deleted the original branch),
implements the ability of slaves to have a special configuration
preventing that they try to start a failover when the master is failing.
There are multiple reasons for wanting this, and the feautre was
requested in issue #3021 time ago.
The differences between this patch and the original PR are the
following:
1. The flag is saved/loaded on the nodes configuration.
2. The 'myself' node is now flag-aware, the flag is updated as needed
when the configuration is changed via CONFIG SET.
3. The flag name uses NOFAILOVER instead of NO_FAILOVER to be consistent
with existing NOADDR.
4. The redis.conf documentation was rewritten.
Thanks to @deep011 for the original patch.
AE_BARRIER was implemented like:
- Fire the readable event.
- Do not fire the writabel event if the readable fired.
However this may lead to the writable event to never be called if the
readable event is always fired. There is an alterantive, we can just
invert the sequence of the calls in case AE_BARRIER is set. This commit
does that.
In case the write handler is already installed, it could happen that we
serve the reply of a query in the same event loop cycle we received it,
preventing beforeSleep() from guaranteeing that we do the AOF fsync
before sending the reply to the client.
The AE_BARRIER mechanism, introduced in a previous commit, prevents this
problem. This commit makes actual use of this new feature to fix the
bug.
Add AE_BARRIER to the writable event loop so that slaves requesting
votes can't be served before we re-enter the event loop in the next
iteration, so clusterBeforeSleep() will fsync to disk in time.
Also add the call to explicitly fsync, given that we modified the last
vote epoch variable.
AOF fsync=always, and certain Redis Cluster bus operations, require to
fsync data on disk before replying with an acknowledge.
In such case, in order to implement Group Commits, we want to be sure
that queries that are read in a given cycle of the event loop, are never
served to clients in the same event loop iteration. This way, by using
the event loop "before sleep" callback, we can fsync the information
just one time before returning into the event loop for the next cycle.
This is much more efficient compared to calling fsync() multiple times.
Unfortunately because of a bug, this was not always guaranteed: the
actual way the events are installed was the sole thing that could
control. Normally this problem is hard to trigger when AOF is enabled
with fsync=always, because we try to flush the output buffers to the
socekt directly in the beforeSleep() function of Redis. However if the
output buffers are full, we actually install a write event, and in such
a case, this bug could happen.
This change to ae.c modifies the event loop implementation to make this
concept explicit. Write events that are registered with:
AE_WRITABLE|AE_BARRIER
Are guaranteed to never fire after the readable event was fired for the
same file descriptor. In this way we are sure that data is persisted to
disk before the client performing the operation receives an
acknowledged.
However note that this semantics does not provide all the guarantees
that one may believe are automatically provided. Take the example of the
blocking list operations in Redis.
With AOF and fsync=always we could have:
Client A doing: BLPOP myqueue 0
Client B doing: RPUSH myqueue a b c
In this scenario, Client A will get the "a" elements immediately after
the Client B RPUSH will be executed, even before the operation is persisted.
However when Client B will get the acknowledge, it can be sure that
"b,c" are already safe on disk inside the list.
What to note here is that it cannot be assumed that Client A receiving
the element is a guaranteed that the operation succeeded from the point
of view of Client B.
This is due to the fact that the barrier exists within the same socket,
and not between different sockets. However in the case above, the
element "a" was not going to be persisted regardless, so it is a pretty
synthetic argument.
This commit adds two new fields in the INFO output, stats section:
expired_stale_perc:0.34
expired_time_cap_reached_count:58
The first field is an estimate of the number of keys that are yet in
memory but are already logically expired. They reason why those keys are
yet not reclaimed is because the active expire cycle can't spend more
time on the process of reclaiming the keys, and at the same time nobody
is accessing such keys. However as the active expire cycle runs, while
it will eventually have to return to the caller, because of time limit
or because there are less than 25% of keys logically expired in each
given database, it collects the stats in order to populate this INFO
field.
Note that expired_stale_perc is a running average, where the current
sample accounts for 5% and the history for 95%, so you'll see it
changing smoothly over time.
The other field, expired_time_cap_reached_count, counts the number
of times the expire cycle had to stop, even if still it was finding a
sizeable number of keys yet to expire, because of the time limit.
This allows people handling operations to understand if the Redis
server, during mass-expiration events, is able to collect keys fast
enough usually. It is normal for this field to increment during mass
expires, but normally it should very rarely increment. When instead it
constantly increments, it means that the current workloads is using
a very important percentage of CPU time to expire keys.
This feature was created thanks to the hints of Rashmi Ramesh and
Bart Robinson from Twitter. In private email exchanges, they noted how
it was important to improve the observability of this parameter in the
Redis server. Actually in big deployments, the amount of keys that are
yet to expire in each server, even if they are logically expired, may
account for a very big amount of wasted memory.
